How decades of Assad regime interference left lingering scars on Lebanon’s political life

Special How decades of Assad regime interference left lingering scars on Lebanon’s political life
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Supporters of the Christian Phalange party and the Lebanese Forces Party gather to celebrate in Beirut's neighborhood of Achrafieh on December 8, 2024, after Syrian opposition forces declared that they have taken Damascus from the Assad regime. (AFP)
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Updated 06 January 2025
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How decades of Assad regime interference left lingering scars on Lebanon’s political life

How decades of Assad regime interference left lingering scars on Lebanon’s political life
  • While Bashar Assad’s downfall closes a dark chapter for Syria, his family’s legacy still looms large over Lebanese politics
  • Maintaining control over Lebanon was critical for the regime, even if it came at the expense of the Palestinians, says historian

LONDON: After nearly half a century of Assad family rule in Syria, there is a glimmer of hope for neighboring Lebanon, which for decades endured military occupation, persistent interference in its political affairs, and a legacy of assassinations linked to the regime.

Bashar Assad, who succeeded his father Hafez in 2000, was overthrown on Dec. 8, marking the conclusion of a devastating 13-year civil war. His ousting is likely to have major implications for neighboring countries — few perhaps more so than Lebanon.

The Assad regime’s interest in Lebanon dates back to the period after the 1973 Arab-Israeli war, when it became part of Syria’s strategy to avoid being flanked by Israel through the Bekaa Valley, according to a 2005 paper by Bassel Salloukh of the Lebanese American University.

But Israel was not the only perceived existential threat. The late Hafez Assad, who seized power in 1970, “lived in constant fear of coup and conspiracy,” Syrian historian Sami Moubayed told Arab News. “Lebanon was where many of his worst threats had been based.”

These threats included Yasser Arafat’s Palestinian Liberation Organization, the Palestinian Fatah Movement, the Iraq-backed Fatah Revolutionary Command Council, and Assad’s comrade turned rival, Mohammad Umran, believed to have been killed by Syrian intelligence in 1972.




Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat (R) with his supporters in Beirut during the early days of the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon. (AFP)

In addition, Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein “invested heavily in Lebanon and would go on to support Michel Aoun’s War of Liberation against Syria during the last stage of the civil war,” Moubayed said.

As such, Moubayed said, Hafez “simply could not afford to lose Lebanon.”

“Due to its proximity with Syria and lax borders, anything could be smuggled to and from Lebanon; arms, spies, saboteurs, assassins, and revolutionary ideas,” he said. “If Lebanon fell to any of Assad’s abovementioned enemies, then his regime in Damascus would become endangered.”

Rooted in Assad’s paranoia, the regime’s involvement escalated and became more pronounced with the Syrian army’s intervention in the Lebanese civil war, eventually leading to a 29-year Syrian occupation of Lebanon.

In late spring 1976, a year into Lebanon’s 15-year civil war, Assad deployed troops to rescue the Maronite Christian militias under attack by the PLO and the Lebanese National Movement.

The National Movement coalition, formed in 1969 and dissolved in 1982, included leftist, pan-Arabist and pro-Syria groups. It was led by Druze leader Kamal Jumblatt, whose killing on March 16, 1977, is widely attributed to Assad’s brother Rifaat.

Assad’s alliance with the Maronite militias against the National Movement and the PLO might seem perplexing given the regime’s anti-Israel stance at the time. Indeed, Syria’s actions appeared to align with Israel’s main objectives in its 1982 invasion of Lebanon; destroying the PLO and installing a Maronite-led government.




Syrian President Bashar al-Assad (L) meets with Lebanese Druze leader Walid Jumblatt in Damascus on September 13, 2000. Jumblatt, who had vowed to seek the redeployment of Syria's 35,000 troops in Lebanon, said Lebanon still needed the presence of the Syrian army as a "pressure" tool to "disarm peacefully the Palestinian camps." (AFP)

But Assad’s concerns about, and enmity toward, the National Movement had deep and complex roots, which ultimately led to his brief alliance with the Maronites.

“The National Alliance actually predates the Lebanese civil war, and so does Hafez Assad’s annoyance with it,” Moubayed said. “On paper, however, they ought to have been inseparable allies, given their mutual support for the Palestinians.

“There were many components in the National Alliance that Assad never liked, like Lebanese Baathists backed by Iraq and Kamal Jumblatt’s Progressive Socialist Party.”

Moubayed added: “The Lebanese civil war came at a time when Assad was in the midst of a major standoff with the Iraq Baath, which had a spillover into Lebanon.

“In mid-1975, and while the war was just starting to unfold in Lebanon, Iraq had mobilized its army and threatened to invade Syria (over water rights). Assad suspected that then Vice President Saddam Hussein would use the National Alliance to create trouble for Syria.”




Iraq’s President Saddam Hussein decorates army officers loyal to his regime in this photo taken in 1998. Fear of Saddam trying “to corner him from both Iraq and Lebanon” was said to have helped influence Syrian President Hafez Assad's decision to continue meddling in the affairs of Lebanon. (INA/AFP file)

Moreover, according to Moubayed, the National Alliance’s relationship with Yasser Arafat was “troubling” for Assad, who feared a “Palestinian mini-state in Lebanon” could provoke Israeli intervention and allow Saddam Hussein “to corner him from both Iraq and Lebanon.”

“When Christian leaders came seeking his help to clip the wings of Arafat in Lebanon, Assad saw it as a lifetime opportunity to destroy Abu Ammar (Arafat).”

This may explain why Assad quickly turned against two Christian factions that defied Damascus by demanding its withdrawal and collaborating with Israel against a common Palestinian and Muslim enemy.

In the summer of 1978, Syria launched rockets and artillery at the East Beirut strongholds of two Christian factions, the Phalangists and followers of former President Camille Chamoun, The New York Times reported.




Lebanese right-wing leader and founder of  Lebanon's Phalangist Party Pierre Gemayel (L) with with Lebanon's Christian Maronite Kataeb (Phalange) party leader and former Lebanese president Camille Chamoun (R) during a military parade in East Beirut May 25, 1980. (AFP file photo)

A third faction, led by former Lebanese President Suleiman K. Frangieh, broke with the others over their alliance with Israel.

Israel came to its Maronite allies’ rescue, then soon retreated, leaving behind a buffer zone controlled by the Southern Lebanon Army.

Fearing a similar alliance between the Lebanese Forces in Zahle, eastern Lebanon, and local allies that could threaten the Syrian army’s presence in the nearby Bekaa Valley, Assad cracked down on the LF. This led to the Battle of Zahle, which lasted from December 1980 to June 1981.

Israel invaded Lebanon again in 1982, capturing Beirut and forcing Syrian troops to retreat to the Bekaa Valley. The majority of the PLO, including its leader Arafat, were expelled on Aug. 30 that year as part of an international agreement to end the violence.




Israeli soldiers on watch in an armored vehicle in Beirut on July 21, 1982. (AFP)

Meanwhile, Assad, who used the rhetoric of resistance against Israel to strengthen his rule, seized the opportunity to gain control of the Palestinian issue in Lebanon.

For Assad, Moubayed said, controlling Lebanon was “almost as important as controlling Syria itself, and if it came at the expense of the Palestinians, then this was a price he was willing to pay.”

In late 1982, Arafat’s stance was reportedly becoming more moderate toward Israel, and PLO dissidents in Lebanon’s northern city of Tripoli began organizing with Assad’s support.

Within a year, and after Arafat returned to Lebanon, the Battle of Tripoli erupted between pro-Syrian Palestinian militant factions and the PLO. Arafat accused Assad of orchestrating the rebellion against him among PLO forces in Lebanon.




Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat (L), Lebanese Druze leader Walid Jumblatt (2nd L), Shiite Muslim Amal Movement chief Nabih Berri (3rd L) and the head of the Communist Action Organization Mohsen Ibrahim (R) are seen in a picture dated August 30, 1982 during a farewell gathering in Beirut before the Palestinian leader left the Israeli-occupied city to Tunis the same day. (AFP file)

The conflict ended the PLO’s involvement in the Lebanese civil war.

“For Assad, it was as much about controlling the Palestinian issue as it was about controlling Lebanon,” Lebanese economist and political adviser Nadim Shehadi told Arab News. “Control of Lebanon gave Assad leverage over the resolution of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. He held the cards and controlled the camps.

“After Israel’s withdrawal in 1983 and the departure of the PLO, Syria systematically took control of PLO assets and organizations. Every party (in Lebanon) saw this, even the Kataeb (Phalangist) Party.

“In each institution, pro-Fatah/PLO members were replaced by pro-Syrian ones,” he added, highlighting that this had culminated in the War of the Camps, the War of Brothers, and the takeover of Ras Beirut by the Amal Movement and pro-Syrian factions.




Syrian soldiers and members of the Amal militia, the first political organization of Lebanon's Shi'ite Muslim, celebrate the arrival of Syrian troops in west Beirut February 22, 1987. (AFP file)

Having influence over the resolution of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict means that “Assad would hold the key variables, and no peace process would succeed without his conditions, approval, or the right price being extracted,” Shehadi said.

“It gives him power over the region. This was demonstrated by the privileges he received in Lebanon through the Taif Agreement and the concessions made for Syria’s participation in the Gulf War coalition to expel Saddam from Kuwait.

“In a nutshell, it gives him veto power and blocking power.”

The Taif Accord, negotiated in Saudi Arabia in September 1989 and approved by Lebanon’s Parliament in November 1989, ended the civil war in 1990. While it called for the withdrawal of all foreign troops, it allowed Assad to impose a de facto protectorate over Lebanon and its political life.




Syrian soldiers celebrate on October 13, 1990, in front of Baabda presidential palace in Beirut, taking over Christian areas formerly controlled by troops loyal to General Michel Aoun, who was forced to lay down his arms before a Lebanese-Syrian military coalition. (AFP)

Between 1991 and 2005, the Assad regime had total control over Lebanon’s domestic and foreign policies. It capitalized on the leeway it was given, skillfully balancing relations between Lebanon’s many sects and factions and playing a key role in fueling many of the tensions that persist today.

The Assads’ involvement in Lebanon was marked by a series of attacks that killed or wounded many anti-Syrian journalists and politicians. In 2005, during Bashar Assad’s reign, the wave of killings intensified. Under international pressure, the last Syrian soldiers withdrew from Lebanon on April 26 that year.

In 2005 alone, at least six anti-Syrian Lebanese figures were assassinated, including former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri, who was killed in a car bombing. His death, along with 21 others, was investigated by a UN-backed tribunal, which found no evidence linking Hezbollah’s leadership or Syria to the attack.

However, the assassination occurred as Hariri and his political allies were debating whether to call for Syria’s withdrawal of forces from Lebanon, the AP news agency reported.

The 2005 attacks on prominent anti-Syria figures also targeted journalists who were vocal in criticizing Assad’s policies in Lebanon, including history professor Samir Kassir; former MP Gebran Tueni, the editor and publisher of Annahar newspaper; and TV anchor May Chidiac, who survived an assassination attempt but lost an arm and a leg.

Throughout their rule, both Hafez and Bashar Assad were notorious for maintaining tight control over the media, a practice that became especially evident during Syria’s civil war, which began in 2011. Although less pronounced, this strategy also extended to Lebanon during their reign.

“Repressive regimes often struggle to accept criticism, as they excel in obstructing the truth and silencing messengers,” Jad Shahrour, the spokesperson for the Samir Kassir Foundation, told Arab News via email from Beirut.

“Under the Assad family’s rule, journalists faced significant repercussions for critical reporting, including detention and torture.”

The atrocities uncovered in Sednaya after Assad’s fall serve as evidence of the fate faced by those who opposed the regime. 

“Similar tactics were used in Lebanon during Syria’s military presence from 1976 to 2005, leading to the targeting of journalists like Gebran Tueni and Samir Kassir,” Shahrour said. “Although Syria’s direct control lessened after 2005, it continued to influence Lebanese media through allies.

“This repression shaped a polarized media landscape in both Syria and Lebanon, creating a dangerous environment for journalists and silencing dissent.”

Shahrour added: “The driving force behind the silencing of dissenters is rooted in fear; criminals within the regime are terrified of the truth.

“Their credibility is tightly bound to their hold on power, which, in turn, is maintained through their criminal actions.”

The withdrawal of Syrian troops from Lebanon, nonetheless, did not end Assad’s influence over political life in Lebanon.

In a speech announcing the move, Bashar Assad said: “Syria’s withdrawal from Lebanon does not mean the absence of a Syrian role. This role is governed by many geographic and political and other factors. On the contrary, we (will be) more at liberty and more forthcoming in our dealings with Lebanon.”

Through strategic political and military alliances, including with the Iran-backed Hezbollah and the Amal Movement, and under the guise of resistance against Israel, the Assad regime maintained significant influence over Lebanon’s domestic and foreign policies.

In 2011, Lebanon found itself with a mainly pro-Syrian cabinet. The formation of this government came months after the eruption of anti-regime protests in Syria, making it critical for Assad to secure a friendly cabinet in Beirut.

Although Assad’s demise signals a potential turning point for Lebanon as it approaches a long-awaited conclusion to its presidential election — ongoing since 2022 and potentially concluding on Jan. 9 — decades of Assad interference still loom large over Lebanese politics.

The Syrian regime “cloned itself in Lebanon” by penetrating “every institution and political party, including ministries, the army, the security services and even religious organizations,” Shehadi wrote in a recent op-ed for Arab News.

“Syria also facilitated the creation of Hezbollah, sponsored by its ally Iran, and balanced it out with Prime Minister Rafik Hariri.”

And despite Hezbollah being weakened by its recent war with Israel and the waning of Iran’s regional influence since Assad’s downfall, Shehadi predicts “a crisis over the formation of the Cabinet and the ministerial declaration following the election of a president.”




Lebanon's caretaker Prime Minister Najib Mikati (2nd-L) and Lebanese army commander, General Joseph Aoun (2nd-R), visit the southern Lebanese village of Khiam on December 23, 2024, after the withdrawal of Israeli forces from the area under a ceasefire deal with Hezbollah. (AFP)

He told Arab News: “The main variable here would be whether the Amal Movement can act independently of Hezbollah. I personally doubt it can, or that (Parliament Speaker) Nabih Berri would take the risk.

“The ministerial declaration upon the formation of the new government will have to address Hezbollah’s arms and the army’s prerogatives to take over and prevent rearming in south Lebanon.”

It will also “have to reference (UN Security Council) Resolutions 1559,” which calls for the disbanding and disarmament of all militias in Lebanon. “Hezbollah will try to block this, and it will take a long time to find a suitable language that satisfies all parties.”

Although the Assads are gone, their legacy is likely to linger. “For over 50 years, the Assad regime flourished by creating problems for its neighbors,” Shehadi said. “It will not be missed.”
 

 


Sultan of Oman reaffirms ties during visit to Algeria

Sultan of Oman reaffirms ties during visit to Algeria
Updated 04 May 2025
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Sultan of Oman reaffirms ties during visit to Algeria

Sultan of Oman reaffirms ties during visit to Algeria
  • The Omani leader is on a two-day visit to Algeria
  • The delegation includes foreign and defense ministers

LONDON: The Sultan of Oman Haitham bin Tarik met Algerian President Abdelamdjid Tebboune on Sunday to discuss ties between their nations.

At the sultan's residence in the capital, Algiers, the leaders affirmed their commitment to enhancing relations to serve their countries' mutual interests, the Oman News Agency reported.

The Omani leader is on a two-day visit to Algeria. On Sunday, Tebboune received him at Houari Boumediene International Airport for an official reception.

Several ministers and officials are in the Omani delegation, including Sayyid Shihab bin Tariq Al-Said, Deputy Prime Minister for Defense Affairs, and Sayyid Badr Hamad Al-Busaidi, Minister of Foreign Affairs.


Can Iraq’s Development Road project become its gateway to prosperity?

Can Iraq’s Development Road project become its gateway to prosperity?
Updated 29 sec ago
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Can Iraq’s Development Road project become its gateway to prosperity?

Can Iraq’s Development Road project become its gateway to prosperity?
  • Once a hub of global trade, Iraq aims to reclaim role with a $20 billion project connecting the Gulf to Europe by road, rail, and pipeline
  • Experts say ambitious infrastructure project could prove transformative if it can overcome the political, logistical and financial hurdles

LONDON: Under the Abbasid Caliphate, some 1,200 years ago, Baghdad sat at a crossroads between continents, a global confluence of commerce, culture and learning, becoming one of the most important cities on the Silk Road — the vast trade network that linked Asia to Europe.

It is that same strategic positioning that the modern-day government of Iraq hopes to recreate through a mega-project that could transform the nation’s fortunes after decades of war, sanctions and underdevelopment, and in the process reshape international trade.

The Development Road scheme aims to connect the Arabian Gulf to the Mediterranean with a 1,200 km network of roads, railways and energy links from across Iraq to neighboring Turkiye.

The project is expected to cost up to $20 billion and will be constructed in partnership with Turkiye and with backing from Qatar as well as the UAE.

Turkey's Transport Minister Abdulkadir Uraloglu, UAE's Energy Minister Suhail Mohamed al-Mazrouei, Turkey's President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Iraq's Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani, Qatar's Minister of Transport Jassim bin Saif bin Ahmed al-Sulaiti, and Iraq's Transport Minister Razzaq Muhaibas Al-Saadawi applaud together during their meeting for the signing of the "Development Road" framework agreement on security, economy, and development in Baghdad on April 22, 2024.

If successful, it could carve out a new future for Iraq, diversifying its economy and raising substantial revenues. It would help export the country’s plentiful energy resources, while also consolidating relations with Turkiye and the Gulf states.

But the project faces several challenges, both within Iraq and the wider region. Corruption, interstate rivalries, political instability and conflict could derail the scheme, as could competition from other trade corridors in the region.

Failure would raise uncomfortable questions about whether Iraq can ever move beyond its chaotic past to build the kind of country its people desperately seek.

“The Development Road project is one of the most important infrastructure projects initiated in Iraq since the formation of the modern Iraqi state in the 1920s,” Mohammed Hussein, a member of the Iraqi Economists Network, told Arab News.

Volunteers of the "army of Al-Quds (Jerusalem)", with pictures of their president Saddam Hussein on their chests during a military parade in the northern Iraqi city of Mosul on February 4, 2003. (AFP)

The idea for a new trade corridor through Iraq has been around for decades. In the 1980s, the concept was branded the “dry canal” — tipped as an alternative to the Suez in Egypt. But wars and sanctions on Saddam Hussein’s regime prevented any progress.

In response to public outrage over Iraq’s continued economic malaise — especially given the size of its oil reserves — the concept has since re-emerged as part of a broader development agenda, helped along by a period of relative stability and improving relations with Turkiye.

The Development Road was launched in 2023 after a meeting between Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia’ Al-Sudani and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan.

Iraq's Prime Minister Mohammed Shia Al-Sudani (C-R) and Turkey's President Recep Tayyip Erdogan (C-L) attend the signing of the "Development Road" framework agreement on security, economy, and development in Baghdad on April 22, 2024. (AFP)

Central to the plan is the Grand Faw Port now under construction on Iraq’s slither of shallow coastline at the head of the Arabian Gulf. When completed, Iraqi officials say the port will have 100 berths, surpassing Jebel Ali in Dubai as the Middle East’s largest container port.

Grand Faw will connect to a network of highways and railways running through major Iraqi cities including Basra, Karbala, Baghdad and Mosul, all the way to the Turkish border at Faysh Khabur.

From there, they will connect to Turkiye’s networks, linking up with its major Mediterranean ports and its land border with Europe. Oil and gas pipelines are also planned to follow the route, linking Basra’s oil fields to Turkiye’s Ceyhan energy hub.

An Iraqi sails in the Shatt al-Arab river across from the Nahr Bin Omar oilfield in Iraq's southern province of Basra on July 18, 2022. (AFP)

The scheme, which will be built in three stages up to 2050, would see industrial areas constructed along its route. However, much of the project still remains in the planning phase.

In April last year, Turkiye, Iraq, the UAE and Qatar signed a joint cooperation agreement on the project during a long-awaited visit by Erdogan to Baghdad.

“The project aims to create a sustainable economy bridging east and west,” Al-Sudani’s office said, adding that it would “establish a new competitive transport route, and bolster regional economic prosperity.”

Iraq's Prime Minister Mohammed Shia Al-Sudani. (AFP)

A planned visit by the Iraqi prime minister to Turkiye on May 8 is expected to advance the plan further.

If successful, the project would bring numerous benefits to Iraq, diversifying its economy away from oil and gas and creating hundreds of thousands of jobs. According to Hussein of the Iraqi Economists Network, the project could generate $4 billion per year in customs revenues.

“The Development Road is likely to enhance Iraq’s role in global trade and directly revitalize its non-oil economic sectors such as trade, transportation and tourism,” he said.

IN NUMBERS:

99% Oil’s share of Iraq’s exports over the past decade.

$20 billion Estimated cost of Development Road project.

(Sources: World Bank & media)

There would also be a major boost to Iraq’s strategic positioning, strengthening economic and security relations with Turkiye, the Gulf states and Europe.

“From a global perspective, the Development Road is extremely important for Iraq, as it positions the country as a land bridge between Asia and Europe,” said Hussein.

“It aims to serve as a new route for global trade from the Arab Gulf to Europe, transforming Iraq into a transit hub similar to the Suez Canal.”

Iraq's planned Development Road is envisioned to position the country as a land bridge between Asia and Europe. (Map Courtesy of Google)

Renad Mansour, a senior Iraq research fellow at Chatham House, believes the project represents a clear statement of Iraq’s ambition to put decades of chaos behind it and become a more influential power in the region.

The government sees the project “as an opportunity for Iraq, after years of conflict and dependencies, to start to regain some traction in the region by becoming an important central hub,” he told Arab News.

Iraq’s geographic position would become a “potential point of leverage” that could rebuild its regional position, he added.

Street vendors push their cart selling sweets across Al-Senak bridge over the Tigris river in central Baghdad during a dust storm on April 10, 2025. (AFP)

The Development Road also offers substantial benefits to Turkiye.

Ankara “views this project as a strategic opportunity to boost its regional role, enhance its trade ties with regional actors and solidify the economic connectivity in the region,” Sinem Cengiz, a Turkish political analyst, told Arab News.

It also marks a sea change in Turkiye-Iraq relations, which have long been dominated by border security, Turkiye’s conflict with Kurdish militants and control of water resources.

“From the Turkish side, it is an opportunity to transform its relations with Iraq from a security-oriented perspective to an economically integrated relationship,” said Cengiz.

“This project provides a framework for long-term mutual dependency and a rare chance for Turkiye and Iraq to compartmentalize, and institutionalize their relations.”

There are, however, an array of challenges and potential obstacles that could delay or scuttle the project altogether.

The biggest risks come from within Iraq itself. Since the 2003 US-led invasion, Iraq has experienced a devastating civil war, a savage conflict with Daesh extremists and the emergence of powerful Iran-backed militias.

An image uploaded on June 14, 2014 on the jihadist website Welayat Salahuddin Daesh (ISIS) militants leading dozens of captured Iraqi security forces members to an unknown location in the Salaheddin province ahead of executing them. (AFP)

“The Iraqi state remains fragmented and corruption is still a big challenge,” said Mansour. “There’s all sorts of challenges, political and security-wise, that would need to be addressed to ensure the sustainability of such a grand vision.”

The country still ranks poorly on Transparency International’s corruption perceptions index, although there has been gradual improvement since 2015. This, along with other bureaucratic obstacles, means ensuring efficient project management is a significant concern.

“Iraq’s reputation for corruption, weak law enforcement, bureaucratic inefficiency, and an underdeveloped business environment will certainly increase the project’s cost and duration,” said Hussein.

The nature of the project means it will have to be built through many regions of the country, each with its own ethnic, religious and political mix.

“The road will go through several different territories where the central government doesn’t have as much authority and you have different armed groups and different sides who would need to be part of this process or could turn into spoilers,” said Mansour.

The route avoids most of Iraq’s semi-autonomous Kurdistan region in the north, apart from the last 20 km where it reaches the border with Turkiye, potentially creating new rifts with the country’s large Kurdish minority.

An Iraqi sails in the Shatt al-Arab river across from the Nahr Bin Omar oilfield in Iraq's southern province of Basra on July 18, 2022. (AFP)

The Kurdistan Regional Government has accused the federal government of deliberately bypassing the territory and excluding Kurdish areas that would otherwise have benefited from the scheme, said Hussein.

“The project has raised concerns among KRG leaders, who are demanding it be designed to pass through at least two of the KRG provinces, Irbil and Duhok,” he said.

The federal government, however, denies the KRG’s claim, insisting the current route is based on cost-efficiency.

There are also major external challenges to the project.

Grand Faw Port is located just a few kilometers from Kuwait’s long-proposed Mubarak Al-Kabeer Port, which is also under construction. The projects have exacerbated a long-running dispute over the maritime border between the two states and raised tensions over competition between the two ports.

Iraq's Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani gives a speech during the ceremony of the beginning of the handover of the Grand Faw Port's five berths from the implementing Korean company, in the southern Basra province, on November 7, 2024, as the project approaches full completion. (AFP)

“To prevent tensions and avoid creating a sense of insecurity, Kuwait must be somehow integrated into the process,” said Cengiz. “This would make the project more regionalized and help build a more stable environment for cooperation.”

Iran, which has huge influence in Iraq, particularly through the militias it funds, is also watching the scheme warily. Some argue the corridor could benefit Iran, but could also pose significant competition to its Gulf ports and plans for its own trade route linking Asia to Europe.

Then there is the rivalry with existing trade routes, most notably the Suez Canal, which is vital to Egypt’s economy. Attacks on shipping in the Red Sea by Yemen’s Houthis have dramatically reduced shipping through the waterway, increasing the cost of transporting goods from Asia to Europe.

Iraqi officials claim the Development Road will offer a much faster route from Asia to Europe than the Suez, even without the current shipping disruption.

Another major corridor through the Middle East is also being developed between India, the Gulf states, and Europe, and was set to include Israel and Jordan. Known as the “India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor,” or IMEC, the project has won the backing of the US. However, the war in Gaza has presented challenges.

Map of the planned IMEC connection. (Wikimedia Commons: ecfr.eu)

IMEC was viewed by some as a response to China’s Belt and Road Initiative — the vast set of infrastructure projects launched in 2013 to create land and maritime networks between Asia and Europe.

China has not yet committed to providing financial backing to the Development Road but has hinted that the project could be integrated into its BRI, raising a possible point of contention with the US.

Despite these many challenges, there is widespread support within Iraq for the project. If successful, the Development Road could become a beacon of hope for a nation emerging from a long night.
 

 


Pope Francis’s popemobile set to become health clinic for Gaza children

Pope Francis (C) looks at model of the Western Wall square with religious leaders near the Western Wall in Jerusalem’s Old City.
Pope Francis (C) looks at model of the Western Wall square with religious leaders near the Western Wall in Jerusalem’s Old City.
Updated 04 May 2025
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Pope Francis’s popemobile set to become health clinic for Gaza children

Pope Francis (C) looks at model of the Western Wall square with religious leaders near the Western Wall in Jerusalem’s Old City.
  • Vehicle, used by the late pontiff during his 2014 visit to the Holy Land, is being outfitted with diagnostic and emergency medical equipment to help patients in Gaza
  • Francis had a number of popemobiles, with the one used in the 2014 visit to Israel and the Palestinian Territories staying in the region following his return to the Vatican

VATICAN CITY: One of Pope Francis’s popemobiles is being transformed into a mobile health clinic for children in the Gaza Strip, fulfilling one of his final wishes, the Vatican’s official media outlet said on Sunday.
The vehicle, used by the late pontiff during his 2014 visit to the Holy Land, is being outfitted with diagnostic and emergency medical equipment to help young patients in the Palestinian enclave, where health services have been devastated by the Israeli invasion.
Pope Francis, who died last month, entrusted the initiative to the Catholic aid organization Caritas Jerusalem in the months before his death, Vatican News said.
“This is a concrete, life-saving intervention at a time when the health system in Gaza has almost completely collapsed,” Peter Brune, Secretary General of Caritas Sweden, which is supporting the project, told Vatican News.
The mobile unit will be equipped with rapid infection tests, vaccines, diagnostic tools, and suture kits, and staffed by medical personnel. Caritas plans to deploy the clinic to communities without access to functioning health care facilities once humanitarian access to Gaza is feasible.
“It’s not just a vehicle,” Brune added. “It’s a message that the world has not forgotten about the children in Gaza.”
Gaza has a tiny Christian community and the Vatican has said Francis used to call the Holy Family Church in Gaza on an almost daily basis for much of the war, which started in October 2023 when Hamas militants attacked southern Israel.
Francis had a number of popemobiles, with the one used in the 2014 visit to Israel and the Palestinian Territories staying in the region following his return to the Vatican.
A conclave to elect a new pope starts on May 7.


Lebanon holds first local elections in almost 10 years

Lebanon holds first local elections in almost 10 years
Updated 04 May 2025
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Lebanon holds first local elections in almost 10 years

Lebanon holds first local elections in almost 10 years
  • President Aoun pins national hopes on municipal revival
  • PM Salam appeals for a big turnout, with security forces placed on full alert

BEIRUT: The first municipal elections in Lebanon began on Sunday after a more than nine-year hiatus.

Voting is taking place by region, with the first round in the Mount Lebanon districts, including Beirut’s southern suburbs.

According to the Interior Ministry, 9,321 candidates, including 1,179 women, are running in Mount Lebanon, vying for seats on 333 municipal councils.

Voter turnout exceeded 35 percent less than three hours before the polls closed at 7 p.m. local time.

President Joseph Aoun highlighted the vote’s significance in restoring confidence among the Lebanese people and international community, demonstrating that Lebanon is rebuilding its institutions and is on the right path.

The polls are the first of his presidential term and are seen as an indicator of voting trends ahead of parliamentary elections in May 2026.

Parts of northern Lebanon will vote next Sunday, May 11, while Beirut and the eastern Bekaa Valley are scheduled to go to the polls on May 18. Voters in the southern regions, severely damaged following clashes between Israel and Hezbollah, will cast their ballots on May 24. 

Lebanon’s presidential vacuum and security developments since October 2023 have affected the civic election process for almost a decade. Authorities last conducted a local ballot in 2016.

Polling stations opened in Mount Lebanon, the first governorate to begin the elections, under the personal supervision of Aoun.

After two visits to the Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Interior in the morning, Aoun said he had “full confidence in the success of this constitutional entitlement.”

He said: “What we are witnessing today in Mount Lebanon will motivate the other governorates. 

“The goal is to revive municipalities as a prelude to reviving the entire nation.”

Aoun also urged voters not to let sectarian, “partisan or financial factors” impact their vote.

On the eve of the elections, Prime Minister Nawaf Salam took to social media to send a message to voters urging them to vote in large numbers.

He described the election as a crucial step toward executing the expanded decentralization mandated by the Taif Agreement, which faced delays for over 35 years and was vital for the growth of municipalities.

Sunday’s elections varied in intensity by district, especially in areas with party and family rivalries. Hezbollah, the Free Patriotic Movement, and the Syrian Social Nationalist Party aimed to retain control of municipalities against challenges from the Lebanese Forces, the Kataeb Party, and civil society activists. 

Supporters from various parties and political factions hurried to include their candidates on most competing lists. This led voters, like one from the Harb family in Beirut’s southern suburb, to suggest “these elections are a crucial political battle, not a competition focused on development.”

Many dynamics have changed since 2016 regarding political and party balances and the map of alliances in Lebanon.

The elections took place in the districts of Metn, Keserwan, Jbeil, Chouf, Aley, and Baabda, which include the southern suburb of Beirut, with security provided by the Lebanese Armed Forces and Internal Security Forces. 

Commando regiments and marine commando reserves were placed on full alert.

In recent weeks, Hezbollah has reached out to families in towns within the southern suburbs of Beirut to create lists that would be appointed unanimously and include supporters from those families. It succeeded in some areas and failed in others. 

The southern suburbs of Beirut, along with the southern and Bekaa governorates, will hold elections later and reflect the level of public support for Hezbollah through the lists endorsed by the party.

The towns of Haret Hreik and Ghobeiry engaged in an electoral battle between closed lists of Hezbollah candidates and incomplete lists of families and young activists.

The electoral process in Mount Lebanon experienced some disorder at polling stations.

The central operations room for municipal elections at the Ministry of Interior reported receiving numerous complaints from various regions involving administrative violations, breaches of electoral law, security issues, conflicts among competitors, and instances of electoral bribery.

The Lebanese Association for Democratic Elections reported several violations, including “the failure of voters to use privacy screens and the presence of roaming representatives accompanying voters into polling stations with the intent to influence their electoral decisions.”

There was a noticeable shift in this election toward campaigning through smartphones, which promoted candidates and facilitated communication with voters.

The presence of candidate posters and banners in streets and neighborhoods has decreased, replaced by social media reels, stories, and closed groups.

The municipalities of Burj Al-Barajneh, Tahwitat Al-Ghadir-Laylaki, and Chiyah were contested unopposed.


Syria to import electricity from Turkiye, rehabilitate Kilis-Aleppo natural gas pipeline

Syria to import electricity from Turkiye, rehabilitate Kilis-Aleppo natural gas pipeline
Updated 04 May 2025
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Syria to import electricity from Turkiye, rehabilitate Kilis-Aleppo natural gas pipeline

Syria to import electricity from Turkiye, rehabilitate Kilis-Aleppo natural gas pipeline
  • Energy Minister discussed with the Turkish side the possibility of mining Syria’s earth minerals
  • Government developing new 80-megawatt transmission line between Turkiye’s Reyhanli district and Syria’s Harem region

LONDON: The Syrian Arab Republic will import electricity from Turkiye and rehabilitate a natural gas pipeline connecting two border regions, the country’s energy minister said on Sunday.

Mohammed Al-Bashir stated that Damascus is finalizing an agreement to import electricity from Turkiye via a 400-kilovolt high-voltage transmission line that links the two countries.

Al-Bashir stated that the government is developing another 80-megawatt transmission line between Turkiye’s Reyhanli district and Syria’s Harem region to supply electricity to towns in northern Syria.

“Additionally, we are working to rehabilitate the natural gas pipeline connecting Kilis and Aleppo,” two cities in southern Turkiye and northern Syria, the minister added.

“Once operational, (the pipeline) could supply 6 million cubic meters of gas per day to Syria’s power generation stations, significantly improving our energy situation,” he added in a statement to the SANA news agency.

The minister said he discussed with the Turkish side the possibility of mining Syria’s mineral deposits, such as phosphate and lithium, and the prospect of exploring natural gas in the country’s national waters. He urged Turkish companies to invest in exploring Syria’s oil and natural gas potential, upgrading power lines and plants, and rebuilding refineries and transportation systems.