Islamabad’s new love for Kabul is pragmatic, but won’t endure without strategic changes

Islamabad’s strategic doctrines, after the recent military confrontation with India, have undergone a significant shift, both internally and externally. Yet one consistent characteristic remains: keeping Delhi at bay at all costs. The Delhi-Islamabad enmity continues to reshape regional politics, hostilities and alliances. Both countries classify each other as enemies in their defense doctrines.

The Indo-Pak conflict in May 2025 unearthed the prevailing anxiety among regional leaders as they sought alliances and reassurances from neighboring states and strategic global partners to gain an advantage.

Although the Afghan Taliban have long been perceived as protégés of Pakistan’s military and Kabul as a component of Pakistan’s strategic depth, relations between the two have recently turned sour. Frictions arose over Pakistan’s airstrikes on alleged militant camps in Afghanistan, claims that the Afghan Taliban are harboring Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) leaders, and disputes over the expulsion of Afghan refugees, among other issues.

While the trilateral arrangement between Pakistan, China and Afghanistan offers Kabul substantial economic benefits, fully sidelining India is unlikely.

- Naila Mahsud

However, in the aftermath of the Indo-Pak conflict, Kabul has re-emerged as a favored partner. Days before India’s airstrikes in Pakistan, India’s foreign minister reached out to his Afghan counterpart in a bid to solidify India’s regional influence and counterbalance Pakistan. Alarmed by India’s diplomatic maneuvers, Islamabad softened its tone and re-engaged Kabul.

On May 30, Pakistan’s foreign minister announced the elevation of diplomatic ties with Kabul from the chargé d’affaires level to ambassadorial status. Kabul welcomed the announcement and reciprocated.

This development clearly indicated Islamabad’s desire to strengthen ties with Kabul and prevent India from gaining influence there.

Just a week earlier, on May 21, China, Pakistan and Afghanistan agreed to extend the multibillion-dollar China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) into Afghanistan. The agreement was reached during a trilateral meeting in Beijing, hosted by Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi and attended by Pakistan’s Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar and Afghanistan’s acting foreign minister.

The $64 billion CPEC project, a flagship component of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), connects China’s Xinjiang province with Pakistan’s Gwadar Port in Balochistan through an extensive network of roads, railways and pipelines.

Though discussions about expanding CPEC into Afghanistan have taken place for years, little materialized, largely because previous Afghan governments under Presidents Hamid Karzai and Ashraf Ghani prioritized the India-backed Chabahar Port in Iran. The Taliban later supported Chabahar as a trade route, especially in response to Pakistan’s repeated closure of its borders with Afghanistan.

India signed a 10-year agreement with Iran in May 2024 to develop and operate the Chabahar Port, situated on Iran’s southeastern coast along the Gulf of Oman. This development allows India to transport goods to Iran, Afghanistan and Central Asia, bypassing Pakistan’s ports in Karachi and Gwadar.

Despite the Taliban’s historical ties with Islamabad, the regime in Kabul operates with strategic complexity. As a theocratic state striving for regional legitimacy and international recognition, the Taliban have multiple diplomatic levers.

While the trilateral arrangement between Pakistan, China and Afghanistan offers Kabul substantial economic benefits, fully sidelining India is unlikely. India has invested over $3 billion in Afghanistan in infrastructure, education and health care. Despite opposing the Taliban’s return to power in 2001, Delhi later became the largest regional donor of humanitarian aid to the former Islamic Republic of Afghanistan.

The geopolitical dynamics have played in Kabul’s favor. The Beijing-Islamabad initiative to extend economic incentives, alongside the diplomatic upgrade, gives the Afghan government greater regional visibility despite international isolation.

For Islamabad, improved relations with Kabul ease tensions on its western borders and open new diplomatic and economic channels. This shift is unlikely to please New Delhi, which has invested for more than two decades in cultivating ties with Kabul and in isolating it from Islamabad.

Islamabad must re-evaluate its long-standing strategic approach to Kabul. If Pakistan continues to view Afghanistan merely as a strategic buffer rather than as a sovereign neighbor worthy of genuine partnership, this shift, while pragmatic, could be short-lived.

- Naila Mahsud is a Pakistani political and International relations researcher, with a focus on regional politics and security issues. X: @MahsudNaila