Pager and walkie-talkie blasts targeting Hezbollah across Lebanon raise questions, stoke Middle East tensions

A man holds a walkie talkie device after he removed the battery during the funeral of persons killed when hundreds of paging devices exploded in a deadly wave across Lebanon the previous day, in Beirut's southern suburbs on September 18, 2024 (AFP)
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Updated 26 September 2024
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Pager and walkie-talkie blasts targeting Hezbollah across Lebanon raise questions, stoke Middle East tensions

  • Communication devices exploded simultaneously across Lebanon, killing at least 15 people and injuring thousands
  • Suspected Israeli attack represents an embarrassing security breach on such a scale that Hezbollah has almost no choice but to respond

LONDON: At precisely 3:30 p.m. local time on Tuesday, an estimated 3,000 pagers carried by Hezbollah members beeped several times before exploding simultaneously, killing at least 12 people and injuring thousands more across Lebanon and parts of Syria.

At least eight of the dead were reportedly members of Iran-backed Hezbollah, and the many wounded included Mojtaba Amini, Iran’s ambassador to Lebanon, who may have lost at least one eye.

But clips from security cameras in shops in Beirut and other locations, circulated on social media, illustrated the dangerously indiscriminate nature of the attack.

 

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Many civilians going about their day also fell victim to the blasts as pagers exploded in supermarkets, on the streets, and in cars and homes. Among the dead were two children who were in the wrong place at the wrong time.

Fleets of ambulances ferried a reported 2,700 wounded to hospitals across Lebanon, where overwhelmed medics struggled to cope with multiple victims suffering serious wounds, mainly to their hips, where pagers are generally worn on belts, and to hands and eyes.

On Wednesday afternoon, further blasts were reported across Lebanon, this time reportedly involving hand-held radios, causing at least three further fatalities and a hundred more wounded, according to Lebanese state media.

 

 

Israel has neither confirmed nor denied responsibility for the attack. But on Wednesday a US official told AP that Israel had briefed Washington on the attack after it had been carried out and, with no other feasible suspect in the frame, there is little doubt that it was the handiwork of Mossad, Israel’s lethally inventive foreign intelligence agency.

It is also clear that, figuratively and literally, the pager attack was both designed and timed to send a message.

The opportunity to use pagers as an offensive weapon arose in February when Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah publicly warned members to stop using cell phones, which are easily bugged and traced and have been linked with many assassinations executed by missile attacks.

 

According to a senior Lebanese security source quoted by The Times of Israel, Hezbollah then ordered 5,000 pagers, which were imported into Lebanon earlier this year.

Initial speculation was that Israel had somehow infected the pagers with code designed to cause lithium batteries inside them to overheat and explode. However, it has since emerged that the pagers used only ordinary AAA batteries.

Besides, the near-instantaneous and synchronized detonations, apparently triggered by incoming messages, suggest the pagers had all been fitted with a small amount of explosive and a miniature electronic detonator.

On Tuesday, a senior Lebanese security source told Reuters: “The Mossad injected a board inside of the device that has explosive material that receives a code. It’s very hard to detect it through any means, even with any device or scanner.”

On Wednesday, Gold Apollo, the Taiwanese firm whose brand name was found on the pagers used in the attack, denied involvement, saying the AR-924 models widely identified after the blasts had been made under license by a Budapest-based company, BAC Consulting KFT.




Hsu Ching-kuang, head of Taiwanese company Gold Apollo, speaks to the media outside the company's office in New Taipei City on Sept. 18, 2024, saying his company had nothing to do with the pager explosion attack in Lebanon. (AFP)

In a statement issued at 1:40 p.m. Taiwan time on Wednesday, Gold Apollo said: “This model is produced and sold by BAC. Our company only provides the brand trademark authorization and is not involved in the design or manufacturing of this product.”

Images of BAC’s headquarters — a modest, semi-detached building on Szonyi Street in the north of Budapest — have spread on social media, but BAC has yet to comment. Its website went offline on Wednesday and the profile of its owner and managing director was deleted from LinkedIn.

It is, however, extremely unlikely that any genuine company would knowingly take part in such an operation, risking Hezbollah’s wrath, knowing full well that the devices would be easily traced back to it. This has provoked some speculation that BAC, established only in 2022, might have been a front company operated by Israeli intelligence.




Combo image showing a walkie-talkie (right frame) that was exploded inside a house in Baalbek, east Lebanon, on Sept. 17, 2024, and a man holding a walkie talkie device after he removed the battery following the pager explosions. (AP/AFP)

A more likely scenario is that the batch of pagers ordered by Hezbollah were intercepted en route to Lebanon by Israeli agents — most probably at a port or airport, where typical customs and shipping delays may have given agents, working with local collaborators, enough time to meddle with the devices.

Budapest, the capital of Hungary, is a major transport hub on the River Danube and is home to Csepel Freeport, the country’s principal port.

Wherever the devices were tampered with, “the use of pagers bears the hallmark of Israel weaponizing digital technology to achieve political ends,” Ibrahim Al-Marashi, associate professor in the Department of History at California State University San Marcos, told Arab News.




Social media photo showing a pager battery that exploded during an apparent Israeli attack on Sept. 17, 2024 against users of the device in southern Lebanon. (AFP)

Israel has “form” in such warfare. In 2010, “a code known as Stuxnet, snuck into a USB drive, caused Iranian centrifuges to accelerate to the point that they destroyed themselves.”

In 1996, Hamas bombmaker Yahya Ayyash was killed when explosives hidden inside his cell phone were triggered remotely by Israeli agents.

“The advantage of the most recent attack in Lebanon is that it allows Israel to strike from a distance while claiming plausible deniability, avoiding a US rebuke at a time when Washington has pressured Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu not to strike Hezbollah,” said Al-Marashi.

But the pager attack, he warned, could lead to a dangerous escalation.




Ambulances are surrounded by people at the entrance of the American University of Beirut Medical Center, on Sept.17, 2024, after explosions hit locations in several Hezbollah strongholds around Lebanon. (AFP)

“Hezbollah does have the ability to weaponize the digital in retaliation, raising the possibility that violent non-state actors might even pursue artificial intelligence to retaliate against their adversaries.”

Given the complexities of the operation, and the sheer workload involved in sabotaging thousands of devices, there is little doubt that the attack would have been weeks, if not months, in the planning.

But it is the timing of the attack that sends the most worrying signal.

The day after Hamas attacked Israel on Oct. 7, its ally Hezbollah began firing missiles into northern Israel — a near-daily bombardment that has increased steadily in intensity, forcing the evacuation of thousands of Israelis from the border region.




Lebanese army soldiers stand guard in Beirut on September 17, 2024, after an Israeli pager device attack against the Hezbollah in southern  Lebanon on September 17. (AFP

After a meeting of its Security Cabinet on Monday night, barely 12 hours before the pagers were detonated, Netanyahu’s office announced that “the Security Cabinet has updated the objectives of the war to include the following: Returning the residents of the north securely to their homes. Israel will continue to act to implement this objective.”

At the same time, reports suggested Netanyahu was on the brink of buckling to the extremist elements in his cabinet by sacking his Defense Minister Yoav Gallant, who has criticized him for having no postwar plan for Gaza, and replacing him with Gideon Saar, leader of the New Hope — The United Right party.

On Wednesday, the day after the pager attack, reports in Israeli and other media, citing anonymous US and Israeli officials, suggested it had been planned originally as “an opening blow in an all-out war against Hezbollah.”





Relatives mourn Fatima Abdallah — a 10-year-old girl killed in Israel's pager device attack — during her funeral in the village of Saraain in the Bekaa valley on September 18, 2024. (AFP)
 

According to The Times of Israel, a Hezbollah operative “had come to suspect the devices had been tampered with.” He was killed before he could alert his superiors, but the decision was taken to detonate the pagers before the plot was uncovered.

The question now is whether Israel is poised to follow up the pager attack, perhaps as was planned, with an all-out assault against Hezbollah in Lebanon.

“We have been teetering on the brink of a wider war for many months now,” Sanam Vakil, director of the Middle East and North Africa program at the London-based Royal United Services Institute, told Arab News.

“Hezbollah and Iran have made it clear they don’t want this broader conflict to erupt, but Israel cannot end the war in Gaza without addressing the security crisis on its northern borders with Iran, Lebanon and Syria.




Mourners carry the coffin of Mohammed Mahdi, son of Hezbollah legislator Ali Ammar, who was killed Tuesday after his handheld pager exploded, in the southern suburb of Beirut, Lebanon, on Sept. 18, 2024. (AP)

“In order to address this security imbalance, which puts at risk the safety of the broader population but also that of those displaced since the war began, Israel is trying to target and degrade the ‘Axis of Resistance’ to stave off further threats,” she said, referring to the loose network of Iranian proxies throughout the region.

“But this strategy could certainly push the groups and Iran to respond and eventually draw in regional states and above all the US.”

Most Israelis, said Daniel Seidemann, an Israeli lawyer and founder of the nongovernmental organization Terrestrial Jerusalem, “will tell you that war with Hezbollah is inevitable, but a large percentage say: ‘Not now.’

“The priorities for many are a ceasefire in Gaza, release of the hostages and dialing down the tension in Lebanon. Hezbollah can wait,” he told Arab News.

“Hezbollah, actively backed by Iran, is a much greater threat to Israel than Hamas and the general perception is that there will eventually be a war with Hezbollah, but Israelis know this will be much different than what we have witnessed in the past. It would mean years of war and vast devastation.

“But Netanyahu has a vested interest in the perpetuation of the war, which would be good for Netanyahu but intolerable for Israel.”

 

 

What happens next, added Seidemann, “is not only an Israeli decision. Will the US provide the munitions and the rest of the world the legitimization to pursue a protracted war in Lebanon?

“The bottom line is that right now, anything can happen.”

For Al-Marashi, “there are a lot of variables in regard to further escalation that make predictions difficult, more difficult than at any time in analyzing systemic conflicts in the Middle East.

“Despite US sanctions on Iran, news emerged over the weekend that Iran has launched a satellite into space and allegedly has provided ballistic missiles to Russia.

“Second, the Houthis in Yemen have overcome a technical hurdle, launching a ballistic missile against Israel and having it hit Israeli soil, meaning Israel’s system that intercepts such missiles failed.




An Israeli firefighter works to put out a blaze after rockets were fired from Lebanon towards Israel, amid cross-border hostilities between Hezbollah and Israel, in Kiryat Shmona, Israel, on Sept. 18, 2024. (REUTERS)

“From that perspective, both Israeli adversaries have demonstrated they can overcome technical hurdles, signaling to Israel that it is not invulnerable.”

Were a regional war to escalate, he added, “it would put US positions in Bahrain and Iraq in the crosshairs of the Axis of Resistance. Biden, seeking to ensure a Kamala Harris victory in the US election, is most likely going to pressure Israel not to escalate matters prior to the election.

“At the same time, if war in the Middle East helped Donald Trump, that would work to the advantage of Netanyahu, who would prefer a Trump presidency.”

The Middle East, said Brian Katulis, senior fellow for US foreign policy at the Washington-based Middle East Institute, “has been teetering on the edge of a wider escalation for much of this past year, with the risk of nation-states going directly to war with one another growing.”




An armored personnel carrier of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) patrols along al-Khardali road along the Israel-Lebanon border on September 17, 2024. (PhotAFP)

It was, he told Arab News, important to keep in mind the two core drivers of events — “a regime in Iran that operates with a revolutionary ideology that seeks to upend the state order of the Middle East, and an increasingly right-wing Israeli government that rejects a two-state solution and is unable to see the historic opportunity it has in opening relations with key Arab states if it took steps to define a clear end to this war that leads to a State of Palestine.”

In this context, “the US and outside actors such as Europe, China, and Russia can play important roles in trying to shape the trajectory of events in the region, but the main drivers are the regional actors themselves.

“One interesting pivotal grouping is the Arab Gulf states, particularly Saudi Arabia, who do not want to see a wider regional escalation with Iran but do want to advance a two-state solution.”

Right now, however, even as uncertainty remains about Israel’s next move, much depends on how Hezbollah will respond to the extraordinary blow it suffered on Tuesday.

The attack, described by a Hezbollah official as “the targeting of an entire nation,” has been condemned as “an extremely concerning escalation” by Jeanine Hennis-Plasschaert, the UN special coordinator for Lebanon.

 

 

In the past year, Hezbollah has suffered the loss of more than 400 fighters, including senior commander Fuad Shukr, to Israeli airstrikes in Lebanon.

But the pager attack represents an embarrassing security breach on such a scale that if it is to save face, Hezbollah’s leadership has almost no choice but to respond with more than the usual daily delivery of a handful of rockets.




Hashim Safieddine, a Shiite Muslim cleric and the head of Hezbollah's Executive Council, speaks during the funeral of persons killed after hundreds of paging devices exploded in a deadly wave across Lebanon the previous day, in Beirut's southern suburbs on September 18, 2024. (AFP)

After Israel’s multiple airstrikes in southern Lebanon last week and now the pager attack, “we are more on the precipice of a regional war than ever,” Kelly Petillo, program manager for Middle East and North Africa at the European Council on Foreign Relations, told Arab News.

“We will have to see how Hezbollah will retaliate now, and the level of that response will determine where this goes. But these episodes are an indication that things are heating up and we are close to the precipice.”

As for Netanyahu, after almost a year of fighting in Gaza, the fear now is that his answer to growing domestic criticism over the apparent absence of a postwar plan may be an even more nightmarish scenario — more war, only this time in Lebanon.

 


Yemen’s Houthi rebels blame US for fresh strikes

Updated 14 sec ago
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Yemen’s Houthi rebels blame US for fresh strikes

  • The Houthis, who control swathes of Yemen, have launched missiles and drones targeting Israel and Red Sea shipping throughout the Gaza war, saying they act in solidarity with Palestinians

SANAA: Yemen’s Houthi rebels on Monday blamed Washington for around 10 strikes in and around the capital Sanaa, as the United States pursues its campaign against the Iran-backed force.
The Houthi-run Saba news agency said two US strikes had targeted Arbaeen street in the capital, another the airport road, having earlier reported two strikes it blamed on “American aggression” and a series of prior bombardments on Sanaa.
The Houthi administration’s health ministry said 14 people were wounded in the Sawan neighborhood, according to Saba.
An AFP journalist heard loud explosions in the capital, which has been controlled by the Houthis since 2014.
The bombardment follows a Houthi strike against Washington’s ally Israel, which hit the perimeter of the country’s main airport on Sunday.
Eight people were wounded in US strikes on Sanaa in late April, according to the rebels, who also reported strikes in other parts of the country, including their stronghold Saada in the north.
The Houthis, who control swathes of Yemen, have launched missiles and drones targeting Israel and Red Sea shipping throughout the Gaza war, saying they act in solidarity with Palestinians.
The Yemeni rebels had paused their attacks during a recent two-month ceasefire in the Gaza war.
But in March, they threatened to resume attacks on international shipping over Israel’s aid blockade on the Gaza Strip.
The move triggered a response from the US military, which began hammering the rebels with near-daily air strikes starting March 15 in a bid to keep them from threatening shipping in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden.
US strikes on the rebels began under former president Joe Biden, but intensified under his successor Donald Trump.
Since March, the United States says it has struck more than 1,000 targets in Yemen.
 

 


Sultan of Oman reaffirms ties during visit to Algeria

Updated 04 May 2025
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Sultan of Oman reaffirms ties during visit to Algeria

  • The Omani leader is on a two-day visit to Algeria
  • The delegation includes foreign and defense ministers

LONDON: The Sultan of Oman Haitham bin Tarik met Algerian President Abdelamdjid Tebboune on Sunday to discuss ties between their nations.

At the sultan's residence in the capital, Algiers, the leaders affirmed their commitment to enhancing relations to serve their countries' mutual interests, the Oman News Agency reported.

The Omani leader is on a two-day visit to Algeria. On Sunday, Tebboune received him at Houari Boumediene International Airport for an official reception.

Several ministers and officials are in the Omani delegation, including Sayyid Shihab bin Tariq Al-Said, Deputy Prime Minister for Defense Affairs, and Sayyid Badr Hamad Al-Busaidi, Minister of Foreign Affairs.


Can Iraq’s Development Road project become its gateway to prosperity?

Updated 05 May 2025
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Can Iraq’s Development Road project become its gateway to prosperity?

  • Once a hub of global trade, Iraq aims to reclaim role with a $20 billion project connecting the Gulf to Europe by road, rail, and pipeline
  • Experts say ambitious infrastructure project could prove transformative if it can overcome the political, logistical and financial hurdles

LONDON: Under the Abbasid Caliphate, some 1,200 years ago, Baghdad sat at a crossroads between continents, a global confluence of commerce, culture and learning, becoming one of the most important cities on the Silk Road — the vast trade network that linked Asia to Europe.

It is that same strategic positioning that the modern-day government of Iraq hopes to recreate through a mega-project that could transform the nation’s fortunes after decades of war, sanctions and underdevelopment, and in the process reshape international trade.

The Development Road scheme aims to connect the Arabian Gulf to the Mediterranean with a 1,200 km network of roads, railways and energy links from across Iraq to neighboring Turkiye.

The project is expected to cost up to $20 billion and will be constructed in partnership with Turkiye and with backing from Qatar as well as the UAE.

Turkey's Transport Minister Abdulkadir Uraloglu, UAE's Energy Minister Suhail Mohamed al-Mazrouei, Turkey's President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Iraq's Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani, Qatar's Minister of Transport Jassim bin Saif bin Ahmed al-Sulaiti, and Iraq's Transport Minister Razzaq Muhaibas Al-Saadawi applaud together during their meeting for the signing of the "Development Road" framework agreement on security, economy, and development in Baghdad on April 22, 2024.

If successful, it could carve out a new future for Iraq, diversifying its economy and raising substantial revenues. It would help export the country’s plentiful energy resources, while also consolidating relations with Turkiye and the Gulf states.

But the project faces several challenges, both within Iraq and the wider region. Corruption, interstate rivalries, political instability and conflict could derail the scheme, as could competition from other trade corridors in the region.

Failure would raise uncomfortable questions about whether Iraq can ever move beyond its chaotic past to build the kind of country its people desperately seek.

“The Development Road project is one of the most important infrastructure projects initiated in Iraq since the formation of the modern Iraqi state in the 1920s,” Mohammed Hussein, a member of the Iraqi Economists Network, told Arab News.

Volunteers of the "army of Al-Quds (Jerusalem)", with pictures of their president Saddam Hussein on their chests during a military parade in the northern Iraqi city of Mosul on February 4, 2003. (AFP)

The idea for a new trade corridor through Iraq has been around for decades. In the 1980s, the concept was branded the “dry canal” — tipped as an alternative to the Suez in Egypt. But wars and sanctions on Saddam Hussein’s regime prevented any progress.

In response to public outrage over Iraq’s continued economic malaise — especially given the size of its oil reserves — the concept has since re-emerged as part of a broader development agenda, helped along by a period of relative stability and improving relations with Turkiye.

The Development Road was launched in 2023 after a meeting between Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia’ Al-Sudani and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan.

Iraq's Prime Minister Mohammed Shia Al-Sudani (C-R) and Turkey's President Recep Tayyip Erdogan (C-L) attend the signing of the "Development Road" framework agreement on security, economy, and development in Baghdad on April 22, 2024. (AFP)

Central to the plan is the Grand Faw Port now under construction on Iraq’s slither of shallow coastline at the head of the Arabian Gulf. When completed, Iraqi officials say the port will have 100 berths, surpassing Jebel Ali in Dubai as the Middle East’s largest container port.

Grand Faw will connect to a network of highways and railways running through major Iraqi cities including Basra, Karbala, Baghdad and Mosul, all the way to the Turkish border at Faysh Khabur.

From there, they will connect to Turkiye’s networks, linking up with its major Mediterranean ports and its land border with Europe. Oil and gas pipelines are also planned to follow the route, linking Basra’s oil fields to Turkiye’s Ceyhan energy hub.

An Iraqi sails in the Shatt al-Arab river across from the Nahr Bin Omar oilfield in Iraq's southern province of Basra on July 18, 2022. (AFP)

The scheme, which will be built in three stages up to 2050, would see industrial areas constructed along its route. However, much of the project still remains in the planning phase.

In April last year, Turkiye, Iraq, the UAE and Qatar signed a joint cooperation agreement on the project during a long-awaited visit by Erdogan to Baghdad.

“The project aims to create a sustainable economy bridging east and west,” Al-Sudani’s office said, adding that it would “establish a new competitive transport route, and bolster regional economic prosperity.”

Iraq's Prime Minister Mohammed Shia Al-Sudani. (AFP)

A planned visit by the Iraqi prime minister to Turkiye on May 8 is expected to advance the plan further.

If successful, the project would bring numerous benefits to Iraq, diversifying its economy away from oil and gas and creating hundreds of thousands of jobs. According to Hussein of the Iraqi Economists Network, the project could generate $4 billion per year in customs revenues.

“The Development Road is likely to enhance Iraq’s role in global trade and directly revitalize its non-oil economic sectors such as trade, transportation and tourism,” he said.

IN NUMBERS:

99% Oil’s share of Iraq’s exports over the past decade.

$20 billion Estimated cost of Development Road project.

(Sources: World Bank & media)

There would also be a major boost to Iraq’s strategic positioning, strengthening economic and security relations with Turkiye, the Gulf states and Europe.

“From a global perspective, the Development Road is extremely important for Iraq, as it positions the country as a land bridge between Asia and Europe,” said Hussein.

“It aims to serve as a new route for global trade from the Arab Gulf to Europe, transforming Iraq into a transit hub similar to the Suez Canal.”

Iraq's planned Development Road is envisioned to position the country as a land bridge between Asia and Europe. (Map Courtesy of Google)

Renad Mansour, a senior Iraq research fellow at Chatham House, believes the project represents a clear statement of Iraq’s ambition to put decades of chaos behind it and become a more influential power in the region.

The government sees the project “as an opportunity for Iraq, after years of conflict and dependencies, to start to regain some traction in the region by becoming an important central hub,” he told Arab News.

Iraq’s geographic position would become a “potential point of leverage” that could rebuild its regional position, he added.

Street vendors push their cart selling sweets across Al-Senak bridge over the Tigris river in central Baghdad during a dust storm on April 10, 2025. (AFP)

The Development Road also offers substantial benefits to Turkiye.

Ankara “views this project as a strategic opportunity to boost its regional role, enhance its trade ties with regional actors and solidify the economic connectivity in the region,” Sinem Cengiz, a Turkish political analyst, told Arab News.

It also marks a sea change in Turkiye-Iraq relations, which have long been dominated by border security, Turkiye’s conflict with Kurdish militants and control of water resources.

“From the Turkish side, it is an opportunity to transform its relations with Iraq from a security-oriented perspective to an economically integrated relationship,” said Cengiz.

If successful, Development Road project could diversify Iraq’s economy, increase energy exports and strengthen ties with regional powers. (AFP file)

“This project provides a framework for long-term mutual dependency and a rare chance for Turkiye and Iraq to compartmentalize, and institutionalize their relations.”

There are, however, an array of challenges and potential obstacles that could delay or scuttle the project altogether.

The biggest risks come from within Iraq itself. Since the 2003 US-led invasion, Iraq has experienced a devastating civil war, a savage conflict with Daesh extremists and the emergence of powerful Iran-backed militias.

An image uploaded on June 14, 2014 on the jihadist website Welayat Salahuddin Daesh (ISIS) militants leading dozens of captured Iraqi security forces members to an unknown location in the Salaheddin province ahead of executing them. (AFP)

“The Iraqi state remains fragmented and corruption is still a big challenge,” said Mansour. “There’s all sorts of challenges, political and security-wise, that would need to be addressed to ensure the sustainability of such a grand vision.”

The country still ranks poorly on Transparency International’s corruption perceptions index, although there has been gradual improvement since 2015. This, along with other bureaucratic obstacles, means ensuring efficient project management is a significant concern.

“Iraq’s reputation for corruption, weak law enforcement, bureaucratic inefficiency, and an underdeveloped business environment will certainly increase the project’s cost and duration,” said Hussein.

The nature of the project means it will have to be built through many regions of the country, each with its own ethnic, religious and political mix.

“The road will go through several different territories where the central government doesn’t have as much authority and you have different armed groups and different sides who would need to be part of this process or could turn into spoilers,” said Mansour.

The route avoids most of Iraq’s semi-autonomous Kurdistan region in the north, apart from the last 20 km where it reaches the border with Turkiye, potentially creating new rifts with the country’s large Kurdish minority.

A view shows Iraq's northeastern city of Sulaymaniyah in the autonomous Kurdistan region at sunset. (AFP)

The Kurdistan Regional Government has accused the federal government of deliberately bypassing the territory and excluding Kurdish areas that would otherwise have benefited from the scheme, said Hussein.

“The project has raised concerns among KRG leaders, who are demanding it be designed to pass through at least two of the KRG provinces, Irbil and Duhok,” he said.

The federal government, however, denies the KRG’s claim, insisting the current route is based on cost-efficiency.

There are also major external challenges to the project.

Grand Faw Port is located just a few kilometers from Kuwait’s long-proposed Mubarak Al-Kabeer Port, which is also under construction. The projects have exacerbated a long-running dispute over the maritime border between the two states and raised tensions over competition between the two ports.

Iraq's Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani gives a speech during the ceremony of the beginning of the handover of the Grand Faw Port's five berths from the implementing Korean company, in the southern Basra province, on November 7, 2024, as the project approaches full completion. (AFP)

“To prevent tensions and avoid creating a sense of insecurity, Kuwait must be somehow integrated into the process,” said Cengiz. “This would make the project more regionalized and help build a more stable environment for cooperation.”

Iran, which has huge influence in Iraq, particularly through the militias it funds, is also watching the scheme warily. Some argue the corridor could benefit Iran, but could also pose significant competition to its Gulf ports and plans for its own trade route linking Asia to Europe.

Then there is the rivalry with existing trade routes, most notably the Suez Canal, which is vital to Egypt’s economy. Attacks on shipping in the Red Sea by Yemen’s Houthis have dramatically reduced shipping through the waterway, increasing the cost of transporting goods from Asia to Europe.

Iraqi officials claim the Development Road will offer a much faster route from Asia to Europe than the Suez, even without the current shipping disruption.

Another major corridor through the Middle East is also being developed between India, the Gulf states, and Europe, and was set to include Israel and Jordan. Known as the “India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor,” or IMEC, the project has won the backing of the US. However, the war in Gaza has presented challenges.

Map of the planned IMEC connection. (Wikimedia Commons: ecfr.eu)

IMEC was viewed by some as a response to China’s Belt and Road Initiative — the vast set of infrastructure projects launched in 2013 to create land and maritime networks between Asia and Europe.

China has not yet committed to providing financial backing to the Development Road but has hinted that the project could be integrated into its BRI, raising a possible point of contention with the US.

Despite these many challenges, there is widespread support within Iraq for the project. If successful, the Development Road could become a beacon of hope for a nation emerging from a long night.
 

 


Pope Francis’s popemobile set to become health clinic for Gaza children

Pope Francis (C) looks at model of the Western Wall square with religious leaders near the Western Wall in Jerusalem’s Old City.
Updated 04 May 2025
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Pope Francis’s popemobile set to become health clinic for Gaza children

  • Vehicle, used by the late pontiff during his 2014 visit to the Holy Land, is being outfitted with diagnostic and emergency medical equipment to help patients in Gaza
  • Francis had a number of popemobiles, with the one used in the 2014 visit to Israel and the Palestinian Territories staying in the region following his return to the Vatican

VATICAN CITY: One of Pope Francis’s popemobiles is being transformed into a mobile health clinic for children in the Gaza Strip, fulfilling one of his final wishes, the Vatican’s official media outlet said on Sunday.
The vehicle, used by the late pontiff during his 2014 visit to the Holy Land, is being outfitted with diagnostic and emergency medical equipment to help young patients in the Palestinian enclave, where health services have been devastated by the Israeli invasion.
Pope Francis, who died last month, entrusted the initiative to the Catholic aid organization Caritas Jerusalem in the months before his death, Vatican News said.
“This is a concrete, life-saving intervention at a time when the health system in Gaza has almost completely collapsed,” Peter Brune, Secretary General of Caritas Sweden, which is supporting the project, told Vatican News.
The mobile unit will be equipped with rapid infection tests, vaccines, diagnostic tools, and suture kits, and staffed by medical personnel. Caritas plans to deploy the clinic to communities without access to functioning health care facilities once humanitarian access to Gaza is feasible.
“It’s not just a vehicle,” Brune added. “It’s a message that the world has not forgotten about the children in Gaza.”
Gaza has a tiny Christian community and the Vatican has said Francis used to call the Holy Family Church in Gaza on an almost daily basis for much of the war, which started in October 2023 when Hamas militants attacked southern Israel.
Francis had a number of popemobiles, with the one used in the 2014 visit to Israel and the Palestinian Territories staying in the region following his return to the Vatican.
A conclave to elect a new pope starts on May 7.


Lebanon holds first local elections in almost 10 years

Updated 04 May 2025
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Lebanon holds first local elections in almost 10 years

  • President Aoun pins national hopes on municipal revival
  • PM Salam appeals for a big turnout, with security forces placed on full alert

BEIRUT: The first municipal elections in Lebanon began on Sunday after a more than nine-year hiatus.

Voting is taking place by region, with the first round in the Mount Lebanon districts, including Beirut’s southern suburbs.

According to the Interior Ministry, 9,321 candidates, including 1,179 women, are running in Mount Lebanon, vying for seats on 333 municipal councils.

Voter turnout exceeded 35 percent less than three hours before the polls closed at 7 p.m. local time.

President Joseph Aoun highlighted the vote’s significance in restoring confidence among the Lebanese people and international community, demonstrating that Lebanon is rebuilding its institutions and is on the right path.

The polls are the first of his presidential term and are seen as an indicator of voting trends ahead of parliamentary elections in May 2026.

Parts of northern Lebanon will vote next Sunday, May 11, while Beirut and the eastern Bekaa Valley are scheduled to go to the polls on May 18. Voters in the southern regions, severely damaged following clashes between Israel and Hezbollah, will cast their ballots on May 24. 

Lebanon’s presidential vacuum and security developments since October 2023 have affected the civic election process for almost a decade. Authorities last conducted a local ballot in 2016.

Polling stations opened in Mount Lebanon, the first governorate to begin the elections, under the personal supervision of Aoun.

After two visits to the Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Interior in the morning, Aoun said he had “full confidence in the success of this constitutional entitlement.”

He said: “What we are witnessing today in Mount Lebanon will motivate the other governorates. 

“The goal is to revive municipalities as a prelude to reviving the entire nation.”

Aoun also urged voters not to let sectarian, “partisan or financial factors” impact their vote.

On the eve of the elections, Prime Minister Nawaf Salam took to social media to send a message to voters urging them to vote in large numbers.

He described the election as a crucial step toward executing the expanded decentralization mandated by the Taif Agreement, which faced delays for over 35 years and was vital for the growth of municipalities.

Sunday’s elections varied in intensity by district, especially in areas with party and family rivalries. Hezbollah, the Free Patriotic Movement, and the Syrian Social Nationalist Party aimed to retain control of municipalities against challenges from the Lebanese Forces, the Kataeb Party, and civil society activists. 

Supporters from various parties and political factions hurried to include their candidates on most competing lists. This led voters, like one from the Harb family in Beirut’s southern suburb, to suggest “these elections are a crucial political battle, not a competition focused on development.”

Many dynamics have changed since 2016 regarding political and party balances and the map of alliances in Lebanon.

The elections took place in the districts of Metn, Keserwan, Jbeil, Chouf, Aley, and Baabda, which include the southern suburb of Beirut, with security provided by the Lebanese Armed Forces and Internal Security Forces. 

Commando regiments and marine commando reserves were placed on full alert.

In recent weeks, Hezbollah has reached out to families in towns within the southern suburbs of Beirut to create lists that would be appointed unanimously and include supporters from those families. It succeeded in some areas and failed in others. 

The southern suburbs of Beirut, along with the southern and Bekaa governorates, will hold elections later and reflect the level of public support for Hezbollah through the lists endorsed by the party.

The towns of Haret Hreik and Ghobeiry engaged in an electoral battle between closed lists of Hezbollah candidates and incomplete lists of families and young activists.

The electoral process in Mount Lebanon experienced some disorder at polling stations.

The central operations room for municipal elections at the Ministry of Interior reported receiving numerous complaints from various regions involving administrative violations, breaches of electoral law, security issues, conflicts among competitors, and instances of electoral bribery.

The Lebanese Association for Democratic Elections reported several violations, including “the failure of voters to use privacy screens and the presence of roaming representatives accompanying voters into polling stations with the intent to influence their electoral decisions.”

There was a noticeable shift in this election toward campaigning through smartphones, which promoted candidates and facilitated communication with voters.

The presence of candidate posters and banners in streets and neighborhoods has decreased, replaced by social media reels, stories, and closed groups.

The municipalities of Burj Al-Barajneh, Tahwitat Al-Ghadir-Laylaki, and Chiyah were contested unopposed.