Will Turkiye and Syria succeed in turning the page on decade-long enmity?

Protesters in opposition-held Idlib and the Aleppo countryside wave flags of the Syrian revolution and hold signs that read: ‘If you want to get closer to Assad, congratulations, the curse of history is upon you.’ (AN photo by Ahmed Akasha)
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Updated 23 July 2024
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Will Turkiye and Syria succeed in turning the page on decade-long enmity?

  • Relations have remained frosty since Ankara and Damascus severed diplomatic ties in 2011 following the eruption of Syria’s civil war
  • President Erdogan’s recent announcement he could invite Assad to Turkiye “at any moment” has elicited mixed reactions from Syrians

ATHENS/QAMISHLI, Syria: Since 2022, senior Syrian and Turkish officials have periodically met in Moscow for talks mediated by Russia. But those meetings have failed to result in a thaw in their icy relations.

It is a different matter now, however, with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan announcing his desire to restore formal ties with his Syrian counterpart, Bashar Assad.

He said earlier this month that he could invite Assad to Turkiye “at any moment,” to which the Syrian leader responded that any meeting would depend on the “content.”

Ankara and Damascus severed diplomatic ties in 2011 following the eruption of Syria’s civil war. Relations have remained hostile ever since, particularly as Turkiye continues to support armed groups resisting the Assad regime.




Since the civil war erupted in 2011, Turkiye has supported armed Syrian factions in their fight against the regime of President Bashar Assad. (AFP)

What, then, is the motivation for changing course now? And what are the likely consequences of Turkish-Syrian normalization of ties?

Syrian writer and political researcher Shoresh Darwish believes President Erdogan is pursuing normalization for two reasons. “The first is preparation for the possibility of the arrival of a new American administration led by Donald Trump, which means the possibility of a return to the policy of (a US) withdrawal from Syria,” he told Arab News.

“Erdogan will therefore need to cooperate with Assad and Russia.”




This photo released by the Syrian Arab News Agency shows President Bashar Assad (R) meeting with then Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan in Aleppo. (SANA/AFP)

The second reason, Darwish says, is Erdogan’s desire to get closer to Syrian regime ally Russia after Turkiye’s drift toward the US following the outbreak of war in Ukraine. Indeed, as a NATO member state, the conflict has complicated Turkiye’s normally balanced approach to its ties with Washington and Moscow.

“Ankara’s cooperation with Moscow is difficult in terms of the Ukrainian issue,” said Darwish. “As a result of the significant Western interference in this issue, their cooperation in Syria represents a meeting point through which Erdogan wants to highlight his friendship with Putin and Moscow’s interests in the Middle East.”

Those in Syria’s opposition-held northwest, which is backed by Turkiye, see an Ankara-Damascus rapprochement as a betrayal.




Protesters in opposition-held Idlib and the Aleppo countryside wave flags of the Syrian revolution and hold signs that read: ‘If you want to get closer to Assad, congratulations, the curse of history is upon you.’ (AN photo by Ahmed Akasha)

During one of several protests in Idlib since the beginning of July, demonstrators held signs in Arabic that read: “If you want to get closer to Assad, congratulations, the curse of history is upon you.”

Abdulkarim Omar, a political activist from Idlib, told Arab News: “Western Syria, Idlib, the Aleppo countryside, and all areas belonging to the opposition completely reject this behavior because it is only in the interest of the Syrian regime.




Turkish-backed Syrian rebel fighters take part in a military parade in the rebel-held northern part of the Aleppo province on July 2, 2022. (AFP)

“The Syrian people came out 13 years ago and rose up in their revolution demanding freedom, dignity, and the building of a civil, democratic state for all Syrians. This can only be achieved by overthrowing the tyrannical Syrian regime represented by Bashar Assad. They still cling to this principle and these slogans and cannot abandon them.”

Those living in areas controlled by the Kurdish-led and US-backed Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria, or AANES, which holds much of Syria’s territory east of the Euphrates River, are also wary of the consequences of normalization.




Map of Syria showing zones of control by the different partipants in late 2020. Some cities then under the control of the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces had been seized by Turkish forces. (AFP/File)

“There are fears among the population that reconciliation may be a prelude to punishing the Syrian Kurds for their political choices,” said Omar.

Incursions into Syria from 2016 to 2019 saw Turkiye take control of several cities, many of which were previously under the control of the AANES.

Turkiye’s justification for its 2018 and 2019 incursions and continued presence on Syrian territory was its aim to establish a “safe zone” between itself and the armed forces of the AANES — the Syrian Democratic Forces.




A member of the Syrian Kurdish Asayish security forces stands guard as mourners march during the funeral of two Kurdish women killed in a Turkish drone strike in Hasakah, northeastern Syria, on June 21, 2023. (AFP)

Turkiye views the SDF as a Syrian wing of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party, or PKK, a group that has been in conflict with the Turkish state since the 1980s.

“Naturally, the Syrian Kurds know that they will be part of any deal that Erdogan wants to conclude with Assad,” said Darwish. “This issue unnerves the Syrian Kurds, who see Turkiye as ready to do anything to harm them and their experience in self-administration.”

Darwish says the Syrian Kurds would accept reconciliation on three conditions. First they would want to see Turkiye remove its troops from Afrin and Ras Al-Ain. Second, an end to Turkish strikes against AANES areas. And third, a guarantee from the Assad regime “that the Syrian Kurds will enjoy their national, cultural, and administrative rights.”




In this photo taken on January 27, 2018, a Turkish military convoy drives through the Oncupinar border crossing as troops enter Syria during a military campaign in the Kurdish-held Syrian enclave of Afrin. (AFP/File)

But just how likely is a rapprochement between Ankara and Damascus? Not very, according to conflict analyst and UNHRC delegate Thoreau Redcrow. “I find the prospects of an Erdogan and Assad detente very unlikely,” he told Arab News.

“Historically, Turkiye’s ideas of ‘normalization’ with Syria amount to a policy of one-way influence for Ankara’s benefit. In this arrangement, Turkiye continues to occupy Hatay (Liwa Iskenderun), which they seized from Syria in 1938, and make military incursion demands on their sovereignty, like with the Adana Agreement in 1998, but give nothing in return.”

Assad has made it clear in public statements that a meeting between him and Erdogan would only occur on the condition of a Turkish withdrawal from Syrian territory. Redcrow believes Turkiye has no intention of leaving.

“I cannot see Damascus being interested in being manipulated for a photo-op,” he said. “The Syrian government is far more prideful than some of the other regional actors who are happy to be one of Turkiye’s ‘neo-Ottoman vilayets.’”

Erdogan may be attempting to capitalize on the trend toward normalization among Arab countries, which began in earnest with Syria’s reinstatement into the Arab League last year. European states and the US, however, remain divided.




A parade by female staff of the internal security and police force of the US-backed AANES, which governs much of Syria’s territory east of the Euphrates River. (AN photo by Ali Ali)

“Whereas Germany, France, Italy, and the UK in particular are more focused on how Turkiye can control the gateway into Europe and act as a ‘continental bouncer’ for refugees from the Middle East and Western Asia, the US is more focused on denying Russia and Iran full access to all of Syria again for strategic reasons, like Mediterranean Sea access and the ‘Shiite land bridge’ from Tehran to Beirut,” said Redcrow.

“The current status quo is far more beneficial to Washington than any reconciliation would be, as it would also endanger the northeast portions of Syria, where the US military is embedded with their most reliable military partners against Daesh in the SDF. So, Turkiye would not be given any kind of green light to place American interests at risk.”

The US House of Representatives in February passed the Assad Regime Anti-Normalization Act of 2023, which prohibits any normalization with Assad. In a post on the social media platform X on July 12, the bill’s author, Rep. Joe Wilson, voiced his disappointment with Erdogan’s calls for normalization, likening it to “normalizing with death itself.”




Troops from the Syrian Democratic Forces and the US-led anti-jihadist coalition, take part in heavy-weaponry military exercises in the countryside of Deir Ezzor in northeastern Syria, on March 25, 2022. ((AFP)

Though there may be little chance of reconciliation succeeding at this point, the approximately 3.18 million Syrian refugees living in Turkiye view even rumors of normalization with fear and dread.

“People are very afraid,” Amal Hayat, a Syrian mother of five living in southeastern Turkiye, told Arab News. “Since the rumors (of reconciliation) started, many people don’t even leave their homes. Even if they are beaten by their bosses at work, they are afraid to say anything for fear of being deported.”

Turkish authorities deported more than 57,000 Syrians in 2023, according to Human Rights Watch.

“A forced return would affect us a lot,” said Hayat. “For example, if a woman returns to Syria with her family, her husband may be arrested by the regime. Or if a man gets deported back to Syria and his wife and children stay in Turkiye, how will they manage? It’s difficult. Here, our kids can study. They have stability and safety.




A Syrian woman is seen at a refugee camp near the Syria-Turkish border. (AN photo by Ali Ali)

The fear of deportation has been compounded by waves of violence against Syrian refugees which swept Turkiye’s south in recent weeks. On June 30, residents of central Turkiye’s Kayseri province attacked Syrians and their property.

Anti-Syrian sentiment in Turkiye is partially due to economic issues, where Turks see underpaid or even unpaid Syrians as a threat to their prospects of employment.

“The Turks are very happy for us to return home,” said Hayat. “For them, it’s not soon enough. We are all living under a heightened level of stress. We are just praying that (Assad and Erdogan) don’t reconcile.”
 

 


Yemen’s Houthi rebels blame US for fresh strikes

Updated 05 May 2025
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Yemen’s Houthi rebels blame US for fresh strikes

  • The Houthis, who control swathes of Yemen, have launched missiles and drones targeting Israel and Red Sea shipping throughout the Gaza war, saying they act in solidarity with Palestinians

SANAA: Yemen’s Houthi rebels on Monday blamed Washington for around 10 strikes in and around the capital Sanaa, as the United States pursues its campaign against the Iran-backed force.
The Houthi-run Saba news agency said two US strikes had targeted Arbaeen street in the capital, another the airport road, having earlier reported two strikes it blamed on “American aggression” and a series of prior bombardments on Sanaa.
The Houthi administration’s health ministry said 14 people were wounded in the Sawan neighborhood, according to Saba.
An AFP journalist heard loud explosions in the capital, which has been controlled by the Houthis since 2014.
The bombardment follows a Houthi strike against Washington’s ally Israel, which hit the perimeter of the country’s main airport on Sunday.
Eight people were wounded in US strikes on Sanaa in late April, according to the rebels, who also reported strikes in other parts of the country, including their stronghold Saada in the north.
The Houthis, who control swathes of Yemen, have launched missiles and drones targeting Israel and Red Sea shipping throughout the Gaza war, saying they act in solidarity with Palestinians.
The Yemeni rebels had paused their attacks during a recent two-month ceasefire in the Gaza war.
But in March, they threatened to resume attacks on international shipping over Israel’s aid blockade on the Gaza Strip.
The move triggered a response from the US military, which began hammering the rebels with near-daily air strikes starting March 15 in a bid to keep them from threatening shipping in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden.
US strikes on the rebels began under former president Joe Biden, but intensified under his successor Donald Trump.
Since March, the United States says it has struck more than 1,000 targets in Yemen.
 

 


Sultan of Oman reaffirms ties during visit to Algeria

Updated 04 May 2025
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Sultan of Oman reaffirms ties during visit to Algeria

  • The Omani leader is on a two-day visit to Algeria
  • The delegation includes foreign and defense ministers

LONDON: The Sultan of Oman Haitham bin Tarik met Algerian President Abdelamdjid Tebboune on Sunday to discuss ties between their nations.

At the sultan's residence in the capital, Algiers, the leaders affirmed their commitment to enhancing relations to serve their countries' mutual interests, the Oman News Agency reported.

The Omani leader is on a two-day visit to Algeria. On Sunday, Tebboune received him at Houari Boumediene International Airport for an official reception.

Several ministers and officials are in the Omani delegation, including Sayyid Shihab bin Tariq Al-Said, Deputy Prime Minister for Defense Affairs, and Sayyid Badr Hamad Al-Busaidi, Minister of Foreign Affairs.


Can Iraq’s Development Road project become its gateway to prosperity?

Updated 05 May 2025
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Can Iraq’s Development Road project become its gateway to prosperity?

  • Once a hub of global trade, Iraq aims to reclaim role with a $20 billion project connecting the Gulf to Europe by road, rail, and pipeline
  • Experts say ambitious infrastructure project could prove transformative if it can overcome the political, logistical and financial hurdles

LONDON: Under the Abbasid Caliphate, some 1,200 years ago, Baghdad sat at a crossroads between continents, a global confluence of commerce, culture and learning, becoming one of the most important cities on the Silk Road — the vast trade network that linked Asia to Europe.

It is that same strategic positioning that the modern-day government of Iraq hopes to recreate through a mega-project that could transform the nation’s fortunes after decades of war, sanctions and underdevelopment, and in the process reshape international trade.

The Development Road scheme aims to connect the Arabian Gulf to the Mediterranean with a 1,200 km network of roads, railways and energy links from across Iraq to neighboring Turkiye.

The project is expected to cost up to $20 billion and will be constructed in partnership with Turkiye and with backing from Qatar as well as the UAE.

Turkey's Transport Minister Abdulkadir Uraloglu, UAE's Energy Minister Suhail Mohamed al-Mazrouei, Turkey's President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Iraq's Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani, Qatar's Minister of Transport Jassim bin Saif bin Ahmed al-Sulaiti, and Iraq's Transport Minister Razzaq Muhaibas Al-Saadawi applaud together during their meeting for the signing of the "Development Road" framework agreement on security, economy, and development in Baghdad on April 22, 2024.

If successful, it could carve out a new future for Iraq, diversifying its economy and raising substantial revenues. It would help export the country’s plentiful energy resources, while also consolidating relations with Turkiye and the Gulf states.

But the project faces several challenges, both within Iraq and the wider region. Corruption, interstate rivalries, political instability and conflict could derail the scheme, as could competition from other trade corridors in the region.

Failure would raise uncomfortable questions about whether Iraq can ever move beyond its chaotic past to build the kind of country its people desperately seek.

“The Development Road project is one of the most important infrastructure projects initiated in Iraq since the formation of the modern Iraqi state in the 1920s,” Mohammed Hussein, a member of the Iraqi Economists Network, told Arab News.

Volunteers of the "army of Al-Quds (Jerusalem)", with pictures of their president Saddam Hussein on their chests during a military parade in the northern Iraqi city of Mosul on February 4, 2003. (AFP)

The idea for a new trade corridor through Iraq has been around for decades. In the 1980s, the concept was branded the “dry canal” — tipped as an alternative to the Suez in Egypt. But wars and sanctions on Saddam Hussein’s regime prevented any progress.

In response to public outrage over Iraq’s continued economic malaise — especially given the size of its oil reserves — the concept has since re-emerged as part of a broader development agenda, helped along by a period of relative stability and improving relations with Turkiye.

The Development Road was launched in 2023 after a meeting between Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia’ Al-Sudani and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan.

Iraq's Prime Minister Mohammed Shia Al-Sudani (C-R) and Turkey's President Recep Tayyip Erdogan (C-L) attend the signing of the "Development Road" framework agreement on security, economy, and development in Baghdad on April 22, 2024. (AFP)

Central to the plan is the Grand Faw Port now under construction on Iraq’s slither of shallow coastline at the head of the Arabian Gulf. When completed, Iraqi officials say the port will have 100 berths, surpassing Jebel Ali in Dubai as the Middle East’s largest container port.

Grand Faw will connect to a network of highways and railways running through major Iraqi cities including Basra, Karbala, Baghdad and Mosul, all the way to the Turkish border at Faysh Khabur.

From there, they will connect to Turkiye’s networks, linking up with its major Mediterranean ports and its land border with Europe. Oil and gas pipelines are also planned to follow the route, linking Basra’s oil fields to Turkiye’s Ceyhan energy hub.

An Iraqi sails in the Shatt al-Arab river across from the Nahr Bin Omar oilfield in Iraq's southern province of Basra on July 18, 2022. (AFP)

The scheme, which will be built in three stages up to 2050, would see industrial areas constructed along its route. However, much of the project still remains in the planning phase.

In April last year, Turkiye, Iraq, the UAE and Qatar signed a joint cooperation agreement on the project during a long-awaited visit by Erdogan to Baghdad.

“The project aims to create a sustainable economy bridging east and west,” Al-Sudani’s office said, adding that it would “establish a new competitive transport route, and bolster regional economic prosperity.”

Iraq's Prime Minister Mohammed Shia Al-Sudani. (AFP)

A planned visit by the Iraqi prime minister to Turkiye on May 8 is expected to advance the plan further.

If successful, the project would bring numerous benefits to Iraq, diversifying its economy away from oil and gas and creating hundreds of thousands of jobs. According to Hussein of the Iraqi Economists Network, the project could generate $4 billion per year in customs revenues.

“The Development Road is likely to enhance Iraq’s role in global trade and directly revitalize its non-oil economic sectors such as trade, transportation and tourism,” he said.

IN NUMBERS:

99% Oil’s share of Iraq’s exports over the past decade.

$20 billion Estimated cost of Development Road project.

(Sources: World Bank & media)

There would also be a major boost to Iraq’s strategic positioning, strengthening economic and security relations with Turkiye, the Gulf states and Europe.

“From a global perspective, the Development Road is extremely important for Iraq, as it positions the country as a land bridge between Asia and Europe,” said Hussein.

“It aims to serve as a new route for global trade from the Arab Gulf to Europe, transforming Iraq into a transit hub similar to the Suez Canal.”

Iraq's planned Development Road is envisioned to position the country as a land bridge between Asia and Europe. (Map Courtesy of Google)

Renad Mansour, a senior Iraq research fellow at Chatham House, believes the project represents a clear statement of Iraq’s ambition to put decades of chaos behind it and become a more influential power in the region.

The government sees the project “as an opportunity for Iraq, after years of conflict and dependencies, to start to regain some traction in the region by becoming an important central hub,” he told Arab News.

Iraq’s geographic position would become a “potential point of leverage” that could rebuild its regional position, he added.

Street vendors push their cart selling sweets across Al-Senak bridge over the Tigris river in central Baghdad during a dust storm on April 10, 2025. (AFP)

The Development Road also offers substantial benefits to Turkiye.

Ankara “views this project as a strategic opportunity to boost its regional role, enhance its trade ties with regional actors and solidify the economic connectivity in the region,” Sinem Cengiz, a Turkish political analyst, told Arab News.

It also marks a sea change in Turkiye-Iraq relations, which have long been dominated by border security, Turkiye’s conflict with Kurdish militants and control of water resources.

“From the Turkish side, it is an opportunity to transform its relations with Iraq from a security-oriented perspective to an economically integrated relationship,” said Cengiz.

If successful, Development Road project could diversify Iraq’s economy, increase energy exports and strengthen ties with regional powers. (AFP file)

“This project provides a framework for long-term mutual dependency and a rare chance for Turkiye and Iraq to compartmentalize, and institutionalize their relations.”

There are, however, an array of challenges and potential obstacles that could delay or scuttle the project altogether.

The biggest risks come from within Iraq itself. Since the 2003 US-led invasion, Iraq has experienced a devastating civil war, a savage conflict with Daesh extremists and the emergence of powerful Iran-backed militias.

An image uploaded on June 14, 2014 on the jihadist website Welayat Salahuddin Daesh (ISIS) militants leading dozens of captured Iraqi security forces members to an unknown location in the Salaheddin province ahead of executing them. (AFP)

“The Iraqi state remains fragmented and corruption is still a big challenge,” said Mansour. “There’s all sorts of challenges, political and security-wise, that would need to be addressed to ensure the sustainability of such a grand vision.”

The country still ranks poorly on Transparency International’s corruption perceptions index, although there has been gradual improvement since 2015. This, along with other bureaucratic obstacles, means ensuring efficient project management is a significant concern.

“Iraq’s reputation for corruption, weak law enforcement, bureaucratic inefficiency, and an underdeveloped business environment will certainly increase the project’s cost and duration,” said Hussein.

The nature of the project means it will have to be built through many regions of the country, each with its own ethnic, religious and political mix.

“The road will go through several different territories where the central government doesn’t have as much authority and you have different armed groups and different sides who would need to be part of this process or could turn into spoilers,” said Mansour.

The route avoids most of Iraq’s semi-autonomous Kurdistan region in the north, apart from the last 20 km where it reaches the border with Turkiye, potentially creating new rifts with the country’s large Kurdish minority.

A view shows Iraq's northeastern city of Sulaymaniyah in the autonomous Kurdistan region at sunset. (AFP)

The Kurdistan Regional Government has accused the federal government of deliberately bypassing the territory and excluding Kurdish areas that would otherwise have benefited from the scheme, said Hussein.

“The project has raised concerns among KRG leaders, who are demanding it be designed to pass through at least two of the KRG provinces, Irbil and Duhok,” he said.

The federal government, however, denies the KRG’s claim, insisting the current route is based on cost-efficiency.

There are also major external challenges to the project.

Grand Faw Port is located just a few kilometers from Kuwait’s long-proposed Mubarak Al-Kabeer Port, which is also under construction. The projects have exacerbated a long-running dispute over the maritime border between the two states and raised tensions over competition between the two ports.

Iraq's Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani gives a speech during the ceremony of the beginning of the handover of the Grand Faw Port's five berths from the implementing Korean company, in the southern Basra province, on November 7, 2024, as the project approaches full completion. (AFP)

“To prevent tensions and avoid creating a sense of insecurity, Kuwait must be somehow integrated into the process,” said Cengiz. “This would make the project more regionalized and help build a more stable environment for cooperation.”

Iran, which has huge influence in Iraq, particularly through the militias it funds, is also watching the scheme warily. Some argue the corridor could benefit Iran, but could also pose significant competition to its Gulf ports and plans for its own trade route linking Asia to Europe.

Then there is the rivalry with existing trade routes, most notably the Suez Canal, which is vital to Egypt’s economy. Attacks on shipping in the Red Sea by Yemen’s Houthis have dramatically reduced shipping through the waterway, increasing the cost of transporting goods from Asia to Europe.

Iraqi officials claim the Development Road will offer a much faster route from Asia to Europe than the Suez, even without the current shipping disruption.

Another major corridor through the Middle East is also being developed between India, the Gulf states, and Europe, and was set to include Israel and Jordan. Known as the “India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor,” or IMEC, the project has won the backing of the US. However, the war in Gaza has presented challenges.

Map of the planned IMEC connection. (Wikimedia Commons: ecfr.eu)

IMEC was viewed by some as a response to China’s Belt and Road Initiative — the vast set of infrastructure projects launched in 2013 to create land and maritime networks between Asia and Europe.

China has not yet committed to providing financial backing to the Development Road but has hinted that the project could be integrated into its BRI, raising a possible point of contention with the US.

Despite these many challenges, there is widespread support within Iraq for the project. If successful, the Development Road could become a beacon of hope for a nation emerging from a long night.
 

 


Pope Francis’s popemobile set to become health clinic for Gaza children

Pope Francis (C) looks at model of the Western Wall square with religious leaders near the Western Wall in Jerusalem’s Old City.
Updated 04 May 2025
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Pope Francis’s popemobile set to become health clinic for Gaza children

  • Vehicle, used by the late pontiff during his 2014 visit to the Holy Land, is being outfitted with diagnostic and emergency medical equipment to help patients in Gaza
  • Francis had a number of popemobiles, with the one used in the 2014 visit to Israel and the Palestinian Territories staying in the region following his return to the Vatican

VATICAN CITY: One of Pope Francis’s popemobiles is being transformed into a mobile health clinic for children in the Gaza Strip, fulfilling one of his final wishes, the Vatican’s official media outlet said on Sunday.
The vehicle, used by the late pontiff during his 2014 visit to the Holy Land, is being outfitted with diagnostic and emergency medical equipment to help young patients in the Palestinian enclave, where health services have been devastated by the Israeli invasion.
Pope Francis, who died last month, entrusted the initiative to the Catholic aid organization Caritas Jerusalem in the months before his death, Vatican News said.
“This is a concrete, life-saving intervention at a time when the health system in Gaza has almost completely collapsed,” Peter Brune, Secretary General of Caritas Sweden, which is supporting the project, told Vatican News.
The mobile unit will be equipped with rapid infection tests, vaccines, diagnostic tools, and suture kits, and staffed by medical personnel. Caritas plans to deploy the clinic to communities without access to functioning health care facilities once humanitarian access to Gaza is feasible.
“It’s not just a vehicle,” Brune added. “It’s a message that the world has not forgotten about the children in Gaza.”
Gaza has a tiny Christian community and the Vatican has said Francis used to call the Holy Family Church in Gaza on an almost daily basis for much of the war, which started in October 2023 when Hamas militants attacked southern Israel.
Francis had a number of popemobiles, with the one used in the 2014 visit to Israel and the Palestinian Territories staying in the region following his return to the Vatican.
A conclave to elect a new pope starts on May 7.


Lebanon holds first local elections in almost 10 years

Updated 04 May 2025
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Lebanon holds first local elections in almost 10 years

  • President Aoun pins national hopes on municipal revival
  • PM Salam appeals for a big turnout, with security forces placed on full alert

BEIRUT: The first municipal elections in Lebanon began on Sunday after a more than nine-year hiatus.

Voting is taking place by region, with the first round in the Mount Lebanon districts, including Beirut’s southern suburbs.

According to the Interior Ministry, 9,321 candidates, including 1,179 women, are running in Mount Lebanon, vying for seats on 333 municipal councils.

Voter turnout exceeded 35 percent less than three hours before the polls closed at 7 p.m. local time.

President Joseph Aoun highlighted the vote’s significance in restoring confidence among the Lebanese people and international community, demonstrating that Lebanon is rebuilding its institutions and is on the right path.

The polls are the first of his presidential term and are seen as an indicator of voting trends ahead of parliamentary elections in May 2026.

Parts of northern Lebanon will vote next Sunday, May 11, while Beirut and the eastern Bekaa Valley are scheduled to go to the polls on May 18. Voters in the southern regions, severely damaged following clashes between Israel and Hezbollah, will cast their ballots on May 24. 

Lebanon’s presidential vacuum and security developments since October 2023 have affected the civic election process for almost a decade. Authorities last conducted a local ballot in 2016.

Polling stations opened in Mount Lebanon, the first governorate to begin the elections, under the personal supervision of Aoun.

After two visits to the Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Interior in the morning, Aoun said he had “full confidence in the success of this constitutional entitlement.”

He said: “What we are witnessing today in Mount Lebanon will motivate the other governorates. 

“The goal is to revive municipalities as a prelude to reviving the entire nation.”

Aoun also urged voters not to let sectarian, “partisan or financial factors” impact their vote.

On the eve of the elections, Prime Minister Nawaf Salam took to social media to send a message to voters urging them to vote in large numbers.

He described the election as a crucial step toward executing the expanded decentralization mandated by the Taif Agreement, which faced delays for over 35 years and was vital for the growth of municipalities.

Sunday’s elections varied in intensity by district, especially in areas with party and family rivalries. Hezbollah, the Free Patriotic Movement, and the Syrian Social Nationalist Party aimed to retain control of municipalities against challenges from the Lebanese Forces, the Kataeb Party, and civil society activists. 

Supporters from various parties and political factions hurried to include their candidates on most competing lists. This led voters, like one from the Harb family in Beirut’s southern suburb, to suggest “these elections are a crucial political battle, not a competition focused on development.”

Many dynamics have changed since 2016 regarding political and party balances and the map of alliances in Lebanon.

The elections took place in the districts of Metn, Keserwan, Jbeil, Chouf, Aley, and Baabda, which include the southern suburb of Beirut, with security provided by the Lebanese Armed Forces and Internal Security Forces. 

Commando regiments and marine commando reserves were placed on full alert.

In recent weeks, Hezbollah has reached out to families in towns within the southern suburbs of Beirut to create lists that would be appointed unanimously and include supporters from those families. It succeeded in some areas and failed in others. 

The southern suburbs of Beirut, along with the southern and Bekaa governorates, will hold elections later and reflect the level of public support for Hezbollah through the lists endorsed by the party.

The towns of Haret Hreik and Ghobeiry engaged in an electoral battle between closed lists of Hezbollah candidates and incomplete lists of families and young activists.

The electoral process in Mount Lebanon experienced some disorder at polling stations.

The central operations room for municipal elections at the Ministry of Interior reported receiving numerous complaints from various regions involving administrative violations, breaches of electoral law, security issues, conflicts among competitors, and instances of electoral bribery.

The Lebanese Association for Democratic Elections reported several violations, including “the failure of voters to use privacy screens and the presence of roaming representatives accompanying voters into polling stations with the intent to influence their electoral decisions.”

There was a noticeable shift in this election toward campaigning through smartphones, which promoted candidates and facilitated communication with voters.

The presence of candidate posters and banners in streets and neighborhoods has decreased, replaced by social media reels, stories, and closed groups.

The municipalities of Burj Al-Barajneh, Tahwitat Al-Ghadir-Laylaki, and Chiyah were contested unopposed.